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Introduction
Predictions about important developments in European
politics are always hazardous. At the beginning of this
year, with the successful launch of the Euro behind him,
Jacques Santer was considered a candidate for a second
term as President of the Commission. No-one foresaw
the chain of events that led rapidly to the resignation of
the whole Commission and the installation of a new
Commission led by Romano Prodi. Nor was it easy to
foresee that in a short space of time a fundamental
reform of the Commission would become a top priority.
Although there has been a long-standing concern about
the deficiencies of the Commission it seemed likely that
institutional reform would, as on previous occasions, be
pushed aside in favour of new policy initiatives with
more political appeal. However, amidst the allegations
of nepotism, fraud, mismanagement and neglect that led
to the first report of the “Committee of Independent
Experts” on 15 March 1999, it was hard for anyone to
argue against fundamental reform. The publication of
the report precipitated the resignation of all the
Commissioners. The crisis immediately prompted
proposals for root and branch reform of the organisation.
It could hardly have been otherwise when the report
concluded that “The studies carried out by the Committee
have too often revealed a growing reluctance among the
members of the hierarchy to acknowledge their
responsibility. It is becoming difficult to find anyone
who has even the slightest sense of responsibility.”
(First Report, Committee of Independent Experts p.144,
1999). The Commission sometimes described as the
“conscience” of the EU system appeared, in Freudian
terms, to be more “id” than “superego”.
The resignation of the Commission caught the
Member States unprepared for the process of finding a
credible replacement for Jacques Santer. Within the
normal time schedule the tactics of the Presidential
succession process are somewhat like a 1,500 metres
championship in which the main contenders avoid taking
the lead and, as rivals falter in the finishing straight, the
successful candidate comes through with a late run. In
the crisis circumstances of spring 1999 the course of
events was more like a cycle race in which the eventual
victor broke away almost from the start and established
a winning lead before the peloton could even organise
to give chase. Since his nomination Romano Prodi has
continued to set the pace of reform by announcing a
series of initiatives designed to improve the effectiveness,
accountability and, not least, the cohesion of the
Commission as an organisation and the Commissioners
as a college. These include: changes in the status, terms
of appointment and accountability of Commissioners;
changes in the composition and role of Commissioners’
Cabinets; the creation of subgroups of Commissioners
to improve internal coordination and changes in structure
and top-level personnel of the Commission’s DGs and
services. One significant indication of commitment to
reform is the appointment of Neil Kinnock as the Vice
President of the Commission with responsibility for
administrative reform.
The hectic pace of political events over the past few
months has transformed public expectations about
reforming the Commission from ‘reform impossible” to
“reform inevitable”. There are dangers in this. It is
important to maintain a realistic perspective. Major
changes in the way any organisation functions do not
take place overnight. Although the Commission does
seem to be on the verge of the first really significant
reform in its history, it would be unrealistic and probably
counter-productive to expect dramatic improvements
in performance in the short term. For understandable
reasons concerns have tended to focus narrowly on
questions of personal integrity, public accountability
and organisational structure. These are important but
they are also symptoms of deeper problems. The broader
context of reform must not be ignored. The main driving
force is the commitment to widening the membership of
the EU. The eastward enlargement, whatever its scale
and timing, will entail basic institutional changes. The
process of transition and the operation of a Union of
twenty or more Member States will impose heavy
additional loads on the whole system which the present
organisation is simply not equipped to bear.
Real progress in reforming a system as complex as
the EU (for reform cannot be confined to the Commission
itself) will take years rather than months. Fortunately,
contrary to general impressions, a start in improving the
organisation and management of the Commission had
begun before the crisis blew up. The useful preparatory
work done under the previous Commission should not
be overlooked. Despite the narrow constraints imposed
on Santer’s Presidency by the Member States at the time
of his appointment his Commission did make some
progress in implementing the commitment to “do better
rather than do more”. The political stalemate during the
Maastricht II IGC had the unintended consequence of
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providing a breathing space by limiting the increase in
EU policy responsibilities in the Amsterdam Treaty.
Agenda 2000 instigated a process of internal reform of
financial and personnel management within the SEM
2000 and MAP 2000 frameworks. The new wave of
reform initiatives can build on the experience gained
and lessons learned in introducing these changes under
the leadership of Erkki Liikanen, who is a member of the
new Commission.
Reforming Management: Managing Reform
One of the basic requirements of a well-managed reform
process is, paradoxically, a good understanding of the
status quo. Without knowing the point of departure,
reforms may be based on false assumptions. Proposals
for change may provoke disagreements and mis-
understandings that compromise the credibility of
reformers if they are seen to be ill-informed about the
actual situation. It is useful, therefore, that in October
1997 the Santer Commission decided on a review of the
Commission’s organisation and operations to provide
an up-to-date picture of its activities, resources and
methods. This exercise known as DECODE (Dessiner
la Commission de Demain) began in November 1997
and was completed in May 1999 after the resignation of
the Commission. The DECODE review is a more or less
comprehensive fact-finding investigation of the
Commission’s work, resources and working methods.
An explanation of its coverage and methodology is
contained in the report “Designing Tomorrow’s
Commission”, published in July by the Inspectorate
General which managed the review. Twelve teams of
officials were assigned the task of investigating what
work was being done, why it was being done, who was
doing it and how it was being carried out. Each team was
led by a Director from outside the areas under
investigation. The general approach was to work from
the bottom up to create a detailed picture of what the
Commission does and how it does it. The results provided
both factual information about the current situation and
preliminary ideas about where the problems were.
Although there are few surprises, the importance of
the review is that it provides an overview, based on up-
to-date detailed information, the Commission’s activities
and tasks. “DECODE has been an opportunity for the
Commission, for the first time in its history, to get a
detailed description of the activities in which its
departments are involved and the tasks carried out by its
staff.” (Designing Tomorrow’s Commission. p.71). If
the Commission knows more about its organisation
now than ever before it must be emphasised that this is
only a start. It is still low on its learning curve. The
results, as presented, rely on common-sense categories
that badly need to be refined. For example, DECODE
arrives at a profile of a “standard” DG by leaving out
data about “atypical” DGs and concentrating on
“traditional” administrative activities. On one hand,
some of the DGs defined as atypical are important in
their own right. On the other hand, there is considerable
diversity among the so-called standard DGs that warrants
closer scrutiny and better discrimination. The differences
among them have important implications for the way
they should be organised and managed. Standardisation
suggests the imposition of a uniform approach.
Agriculture is not like Environment or Research and
should not be organised in the same way.
DECODE is a beginning. Aside from its descriptive
evidence about the organisation of the Commission
there are two potentially important side benefits of the
exercise that may have lasting value in the process of
reform. One is that the work was done by a substantial
number of Commission officials who now have a better
knowledge of the issues of organisation and management
than they would otherwise have had. Their shared
experience and knowledge is an asset that should come
in useful when further reforms are initiated. The other
benefit is that, paradoxically, it is sometimes important
not to make positive proposals at any early stage of a
reform. In any process of organisational change a
preliminary phase of ‘unfreezing’ can help to reduce
resistance to change, facilitate diagnosis, and open up
options for solutions that were previously disregarded
or considered unfeasible. Expectations of change gain
in strength as old assumptions and established practices
are questioned and out-dated structures begin to lose
credibility.
This is not to suggest that reforms will occur
spontaneously as resistance to change melts away. Nor
is success assured solely by political will. Political will
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for successful
reform. Deliberate choices have to be made about the
direction in which to go and thorough preparations are
needed to ensure that there is the ability and willingness
to implement the necessary changes. A combination of
five conditions seems to be necessary for reforms to
succeed: external pressure for change; internal
commitment; a strategy for reform; a mechanism for
managing reform and, finally, feedback to the political
level to steer progress and renew support. At the moment,
the first two of these conditions are now met. Uncertainty
remains about the other three. This article considers
issues accounted with the third condition; the
development of a reform strategy, taking account of
what has already been done to introduce reforms within
the Commission, but looking to the broader context.
Clearly, there are powerful external pressures now and
internal commitment has been strengthened.
The confirmation in office of the Prodi Commission
in September triggered important moves towards
creating the other conditions for reform. Unfortunately
it also seems to have raised expectations of quick
results. The proactive leadership style that the new
President adopted has given the Commission more
room for manoeuvre in developing reform proposals.
The question now is how it will be used. There are sure
to be pressures from the European Parliament, from the
Member States and from other sources to include or
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would reduce the credibility of reforms inside as well as
outside the Commission. It will become important that
specific changes can be seen as parts of a coherent
strategy rather than a piecemeal collection of unrelated
individual initiatives. At the same time, there is a danger
of being too prescriptive too soon. The Commission
needs a sustained and progressive process of reform
rather than shock therapy. An overambitious crash
programme could undermine rather than strengthen the
capacities to manage change in the long term. Neil
Kinnock is to present a “blueprint for reform” early next
year. It may be wrong to read too much significance into
the phraseology. Taken literally, it suggests a complete
package of proposals that provide a detailed design. But
there is a danger of failing to see the wood for the trees.
Before going into details it is important to be clear about
the scope and purpose of reform. Should the aim be to
make the Commission better at doing what it already
does, or to equip it for a new role better suited than it is
at present to the challenges of deepening and widening
integration? While there is no absolute contradiction
between these goals it is important to understand that
they are not the same and the actions taken initially have
been based on the established agenda for reform which
is more clearly geared to upgrading the existing
organisation than adapting the Commission to the
challenges ahead.
The Established Reform Agenda
Many of the items on the current agenda for reforming
the Commission are familiar from previous, unsuccess-
ful, attempts to instigate change. They include:
• the functions of the Commission and the priorities
among them;
• the independence of Commissioners and their roles
within the organisation and outside it;
• the internal organisation and decision-making
processes of the College of Commissioners, including
the powers of the President and the continued
appropriateness of collegial decision-making;
• the accountability of the Commission as a body and
of individual Commissioners;
• the structure of the Commission services, in particular
the number of DGs, the division of responsibilities
between them and the means of ensuring better
coordination among them;
• the role of Commissioners’ cabinets in policy
development, coordination and management;
• the scope for “unbundling” existing responsibilities
and decentralising their performance to, for example,
independent regulatory authorities or European
Agencies;
• improved management of personnel, finance and
policy responsibilities within DGs and greater
flexibility across the Commission as a whole, taking
advantage of opportunities for greater delegation of
management responsibility and less reliance on
detailed hierarchical supervision as a means central
control.
The Prodi Commission has already begun to
introduce changes in several of these areas. But to limit
reform to them would be to underestimate the task of
reforming the Commission. The established agenda
does not address the full range of issues that an effective
reform strategy should take into account. The familiarity
of the agenda items listed above is a warning that the
debate has become stuck in a rut. To a remarkable extent
current proposals are framed by the terms of debate
established in the Spierenburg Report of twenty years
ago. This does not mean that they are insignificant.
Some of the reform issues are perennial problems of
organisation and management that can and should be
dealt with. Perhaps the most frequently quoted examples
are reducing the numbers of Commissioners and DGs.
There is scope for differences of view about what are the
right answers to these questions, but they are details in
much larger picture. Discussing the reform of the
Commission solely on the basis of the Spierenburg
agenda is “safe” in the sense that everyone knows the
issues, the arguments and the counter-arguments. But
new issues and proposed solutions are emerging more
strongly than they have done in the past. The established
agenda does not provide an adequate basis for
formulating a reform strategy that will assure the
effectiveness of the EU in the longer term. Too much is
happening in the field of European integration and too
little has been done to encompass new issues that have
arisen as a consequence of the advances European
integration has made in the last twenty years.
Management as the Solution
In one respect the main theme of a forward-looking
reform strategy is clear. Better management is the
answer to the problems of poor performance, negligence
and lack of accountability. And, in fact there appears to
have been surprisingly rapid agreement on better
management as the solution. The Commission seems to
be moving belatedly in the general direction that the
Member States have already gone – towards the
introduction of modern management methods as the
means of improving performance and accountability.
No-one can seriously deny that there is a great deal of
room for improvement. The crisis earlier this year
highlighted the managerial inadequacies of the
Commission. Subsequent debate, comment and criticism
of lack of accountability and excessive bureaucracy
have frequently portrayed “management” as the key to
improved performance. The Second Report of the
Independent Experts has provided evidence of specific
failings and more general management shortcomings.
The logic of the situation requires the introduction
of better forms of management. The Commission cannot
expect a large increase in staff or financial resources in
the coming years. What it can expect is a significant
increase in workload as the direct demands of the
enlargement process rise and the consequential indirect
demands for policy adjustments and institutional
reorganisation also grow. The Commission will therefore6 Eipascope 99/3
have to find ways of managing by making better use of
available resources than it has done in the past. Among
other things this will mean a greater concern with results
and less acceptance of procedural rigidity and
complexity. It will mean more decentralisation and
greater flexibility in the way human resources are
allocated and used. It will also mean better management
of financial resources with closer control over their
allocation and use. This in turn depends on improved
flows of information about actual results and more
explicit measurement of performance. Better internal
accountability will provide the basis for improved public
accountability.
This, however, does not mean that management is a
panacea. Nor does it mean that there is a ready-made
management solution that the commission can
implement. In fact, defining management as the solution
to the problem of poor performance is the beginning
rather than the end of the debate about what the reform
strategy should be. As everyone knows, there is not an
agreed body of universally applicable management
principles. The days of one-size-fits-all management
thinking are long past. Conversely, the management
field is very vulnerable to shifting fads and fashions
which provide a good living for management consulting
boutiques. Apart from anything else it is wrong to
assume that there is agreement about what management
means in the context of the Commission. Is it basically
the same as business management or closely similar to
public management in national government? Are the
differences more important?
At another level, implementing management reforms
is fraught with difficulties. It will require a major
cultural change that calls for extremely careful handling.
Superficial acceptance of reform proposals will not
produce lasting results if it fails to change institutionalised
values and deeply ingrained habits of thought. At least
until recently, “management” has not been a well-
established or highly-valued element in the organisa-
tional culture of the Commission. As in most national
governments, policy-related responsibilities have been
more positively regarded and accorded a higher priority.
The Commission’s right of initiative has given it a key
role in the policy formulation process. Ambitious
Commission officials could expect to enhance their
reputations and advance their career prospects by being
involved in launching new policy initiatives. Conversely,
the tasks of management making the resulting policies
work in practice have been perceived as much less
rewarding intrinsically and extrinsically. Neglect of
management has been rationalised by defining it as
routine, unproblematic and, therefore, unworthy of the
time and attention of top level officials.
One might say that this is nothing new. In national
governments public management reforms have
encountered similar cultural obstacles and resistance to
the acceptance of management ideas. The belief systems
of senior officials have been more oriented to current
policy issues and short-term political concerns than to
questions of long-term performance. As elements of the
administrative culture such belief systems are buttressed
and protected by “disbelief systems” that simplify and
discount the contribution that management can make to
performance. One of the most deeply entrenched
elements of the disbelief system is the policy-
implementation dichotomy itself. By defining
management as routine follow-up and implementation
of policy decisions it justifies a segregation of policy
makers and policy managers. Often status differences
and organisational demarcations increase barriers to
communication and cooperation.
There is another cultural dimension to reforming the
Commission that could significantly influence the impact
and eventual results of reforms. This is the stereotyping
of management proposals as alien “Anglo-Saxon’ ideas
being transplanted into the European body politic. The
more clearly reform proposals can be identified as
business-based or American in origin, the more likely it
is that attempts to introduce them will activate rejection
mechanisms in and around the Commission. The
appointment of a British Commissioner to lead the
reform process may contribute to heightening these
anxieties. But the problems would have to be faced
anyway. If experience elsewhere is anything to go by,
such problems are not insuperable. Most Member States
are some way down the road in introducing management
reforms. They do not all conform to a uniform approach.
Attempts to delimit a unifying concept of “New Public
Management” (NPM) or to identify a convergence on a
single set of NPM solutions have been inconclusive.
There is considerable diversity in the solutions adopted.
In part this reflects diversity in the underlying problems
and in institutional structures. The fact of diversity in the
problems to be solved and the possible solutions preclude
any simplistic process of imitation. It makes no more
sense for the Commission to copy what national
governments are doing than for national governments
to copy business management models and methods.
Diagnosing the Management Deficit
Advocating management as the solution presupposes a
diagnosis of the problems that need to be resolved. As
yet there is no systematic diagnosis and there is a danger
that political pressures to demonstrate short-term
progress will result in too much attention to obvious
symptoms and too little to underlying causes. The
importance of thorough diagnosis is especially important
in the case of the Commission for two different reasons.
The first is that the recent problems of the Commission
are part of the wider problem of the EU’s management
deficit. The EU has a structural bias towards taking on
responsibilities that it does not have the capacities to
fulfil. This can no longer be regarded as a temporary
weakness that can be corrected in the future. On the
contrary it is a serious and growing problem that could
easily get out of hand if it is not dealt with before the
forthcoming enlargement. Although the details are
complex and depend on the policy field in question, the7 Eipascope 99/3
general picture is that there are inadequate capacities.
Moreover, dealing with the management deficit requires
much more extensive and effective coordination between
the administrations of the Member States and the
Commission.
The second reason for emphasising the importance
of diagnosis that the Commission can easily become the
scapegoat for problems and failures that have broader
systemic causes. Reform of the Commission is
undoubtedly necessary. But it should not be seen in
isolation from broader questions about the functioning
of the whole system. The last IGC checked the issue of
institutional reform but it will be very difficult to avoid
in the next one. The diagnostic process, viewed as part
of a strategy for managing change should be conducted
so as to develop a shared understanding of the problems
and shared responsibility for introducing change.
A Three-Pronged Strategy
To deal with the management deficit the Commission is
not in a position where it can simply imitate what
national governments have already done. It can learn
from their experience. But it will have to develop its
own criteria for selecting from that experience and it
will also have to innovate in designing solutions. In
formulating a strategy for reforming the Commission it
is important to distinguish among three different
objectives. One is reform of the internal organisation.
This is what springs most readily to mind when the
subject of reform is raised. The second is reforms aimed
at improving the Commission’s performance in policy
management. The focus here is on the processes of EU
policy implementation. The third is related to the future
needs of integration as a whole. A three-pronged strategy
for reform is needed to address the different management
issues that arise in pursuing these different objectives.
Reforming the Existing Organisation
Reform of the Commission is often equated with reform
of its internal organisation to make it more efficient at
what it does. The focus is on getting the Commission to
put its own house in order, to be better organised and
managed to do what it is currently doing. This is the
perspective on which the DECODE review was based.
It is where reform of the commission has most in
common with public management reforms in the
administration of the Member States. The main directions
in which reforms can be expected to develop – indeed
are already developing – include clarification of
structures and responsibilities within DGs with greater
decentralisation and better central control; fewer DGs
and better coordination among them; specification of
operational goals and clearer performance indicators.
Reforming the internal organisation of the
Commission is a major task in itself. Organisational
structures and established practices have tended to
promote fragmentation rather than develop effective
means of coordination. Ironically, for an organisation
whose business is integration, the Commission is poorly
integrated. At the most basic level there has often been
confusion and disagreement about the assignment of
responsibilities among DGs. Clearer definition of who
is responsible for what is a first step towards identifying
patterns of interdependence and diagnosing needs for
coordination among DGs.
The DECODE review noted the considerable increase
in project management responsibilities in the
Commission. It also commented on the inadequacy of
resources and skills for managing projects in relation to
the Structural Funds and the Accession process. Project
management is a field in itself with its own set of
problems and techniques that are, in some important
respects, distinct from those appropriate for running
ongoing operations. Projects have determinate goals
and a time frame. The key questions for project managers
are how to complete a project on time, to standard and
within budget. Unrealistic project assessments in any of
these three directions is liable to lead to slippage in the
others. When project involve contractual relationships
with outside organisations, as they often do in the case
of the Commission, the need for sophisticated project
management increases sharply.
A somewhat different direction of reform that has
grown in prominence in recent years is the creation of
European Agencies to perform specific specialised tasks.
Sometimes this is seen as a way of decentralising the
growing range of Commission responsibilities. Parallels
are often drawn with the creation of executive agencies
in national governments. However, this is a misleading
analogy. European agencies are not just executive bodies
with narrowly defined operational management tasks.
They are in an important respect integrative organisations
that help to strengthen the administrative networks
through which many EU policies are managed.
The Commission as Policy Manager
Reforming the Commission is not just a matter of
streamlining the internal organisation. The external
dimension of management is extremely important.
Particularly in its role as policy manager the Commission
works with and through the administrations of the
Member States. As the discussion of project management
and European Agencies indicates, managing European
policies usually involves networks of organisations
linking levels of government and extending across and
beyond the administrations of the Member States.
The Commission as policy manager is not usually an
executive authority with direct operational responsi-
bilities. Rather, it is responsible for ensuring that
operational responsibilities are performed, and necessary
support functions are provided, by other organisations.
In general this means working through partnerships and
establishing reliable organisational networks. Since there
is no EU competence in public administration, this is a
delicate task. The Commission is in the business of
managing interdependence among national organis-
ations that do not necessarily cooperate easily. It might
be said that this is not fundamentally different from the8 Eipascope 99/3
position of central ministries in national governments.
Public management is almost invariable getting things
done through other organisations. More or less all
public services demand the combined efforts of several,
or even many, organisations. However there are both
qualitative and quantitative differences that influence
the performance of the Commission as policy manager
when the same policies have to be implemented across
fifteen different countries. It is exceedingly difficult to
design and manage systems that take account of
institutional diversity and variations in levels of resources
and expertise. It is not clear that the Commission is
equipped to cope with the present complexities of
policy management. A great deal has to be taken on trust
and if trust proves to be ill-founded the consequences
can be catastrophic. The most obvious recent example
is the “Mad Cow Disease”.
The second report of the Committee of Independent
Experts, published in September, made much less public
impact than the first report in March. Nevertheless, it
should receive close attention from anyone concerned
about equipping the Commission to play its role as
policy manager. The report draws a distinction between
direct and shared management. This is not, as one might
expect, a distinction between what is done in-house and
what is contracted out. It is a distinction between what
is the direct responsibility of the Commission and what
is a shared responsibility with the Member States. In
fact, as the report observes, one of the problematic
features of the Commission’s exercise of its direct
management responsibilities is that it relies increasingly
on contracting out the work that has to be done.
Capacity-Building: A New Role for the
Commission
The third objective is the most important in the long
term for the effectiveness of the EU. It is to develop a
new role for the Commission as the organisation
responsible for ensuring that the capacities needed to
manage the enlargement process and the enlarged system
are adequately provided. Importantly, this does not
mean the acquisition of new policy responsibilities or
executive authority. To play a capacity-building role in
designing organisational networks and developing
management capacities to make them work, the
Commission will have to re-establish its credibility and
acquire new skills. This will be difficult politically as
well as technically. Just at the moment the Commission’s
reputation is at a low point and it is hardly in a position
to give lessons in management to others. A capacity-
building role does not fit in easily with the responsibilities
the Commission already has. But it is hard to see any
other organisation taking on responsibility for dealing
with the management deficit. No-one has done so until
now.
If the political difficulties are obvious the technical
challenges are enormous. European integration presents
problems that are as different from public management
problems at the national level and it is so far ahead of
other initiatives in regional integration that there is no
option but to find ways of learning from its own
experience. Reforms of the Commission’s internal
organisation and moves to improve its performance in
policy management can support developments in this
direction. Indeed they should be deliberately designed
to do so. However, managing even the present portfolio
of responsibilities across a significantly enlarged EU
warrants deliberate investment in the new institutional
capacities that will be required to ensure success.
Conclusions
The conventional agenda of reform dating back to the
Spierenburg report has concentrated on restructuring
and streamlining the organisation itself. The current
situation demands something broader and more
ambitious. In order to cope with the next phase of
integration the Commission needs to be reinvented so
that it can play a strategic role in building the capacities
needed to manage European policies effectively. In the
main, the capacities are not internal to the Commission.
They are distributed across organisational networks
linking the Member States and the core European
institutions. Ensuring that the networks contain the
requisite capacities and function as effective and reliable
regimes will require innovation in organisation and
management rather than simply imitation. The challenges
are quite unprecedented. There are no ready-made
models or blueprints to work from.
In the past the main obstacle to reforming the
Commission has been political disagreement about the
substantive goals and future course of integration. The
proposal here, is to adopt a different approach and focus
reform efforts on equipping the Commission to play a
new role in building capacities for integration. Whatever
the substantive policies and specific objectives of
integration, the effective performance of the system as
a whole depends on ensuring that there are the right
capacities to put them into effect. This will require
significant innovation in the design of new governance
structures and in the development of new methods for
managing very complex and large-scale reforms. At
present there is no institution responsible for this. The
pressure is on the Commission to move rapidly from
being a laggard in public management to being a leader.9 Eipascope 99/3
RÉSUMÉ
La réforme de la Commission européenne est
aujourd’hui un point prioritaire sur l’agenda politique
de l’UE. Mais quel est l’objectif de cette réforme? Le but
poursuivi est-il de réformer la Commission pour lui
permettre de mieux  faire ce qu’elle fait déjà ou est-il
plutôt de l’équiper pour un nouveau rôle adapté aux
défis de l’élargissement et de l’approfondissement de
l’intégration? Cet article examine un certain nombre de
questions stratégiques quant au développement futur de
la Commission qui ont été négligées par le passé. A
présent, il s’agit pour les nouveaux membres de la
Commission européenne de traiter de toute urgence ces
questions.
Stratégie, structure, systèmes, telle est la logique
conventionnelle suivie par la pensée managériale. Mais,
le débat sur la réforme de la Commission n’a pas suivi
cette logique. Une grande partie des discussions ont été
un exercice d’introspection et se sont efforcées d’esquiver
la question de la stratégie, car trop polémique du point
de vue politique. Au lieu de mettre au point une stratégie
cohérente pour la réforme, le débat s’est concentré sur
la restructuration et la rationalisation de l’organisation
déjà en place en vue de la rendre plus efficace. Bien que
ce soit là un aspect important et nécessaire, il ne
contribuera que dans une faible mesure à résoudre le
principal problème stratégique: le déficit de gestion de
l’UE, autrement dit le fossé existant entre les capacités
dont on dispose et celles dont on a réellement besoin
pour gérer de manière efficace les politiques
communautaires. S’il est vrai que l’UE est responsable
de la gestion des politiques à une échelle continentale,
en revanche on ne trouve personne qui soit véritablement
chargé d’assurer la présence effective des capacités
requises.
Cet article propose une stratégie triple pour réformer
la Commission. Premièrement, il est nécessaire
d’améliorer l’organisation interne de la Commission.
Deuxièmement, il s’agit d’améliorer le rôle de la
Commission dans la gestion et la mise en oeuvre des
politiques. Troisièmement, la Commission doit
développer un nouveau rôle en renforçant les capacités
pour l’intégration. Cependant, à l’heure actuelle, la
volonté institutionnelle de mettre au point et développer
des réseaux plus fiables et plus efficaces entre la
Commission et les Etats membres fait défaut. La
proposition qui ressort de cet article est donc de
réinventer la Commission afin de lui permettre de jouer
un rôle nouveau dans la constitution des capacités
requises pour résorber le déficit de gestion et améliorer
la performance de l’UE dans son ensemble.
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